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LABOR COMMISSION’S REPLY BRIEF
ARGUMENT
I.

The District Court was without jurisdiction to consider
Derek Price’s untimely challenge to the Labor
Commission’s Order.
Mr. Price did not file a timely petition for judicial review from the final

agency action in this matter. Utah Code § 63G-4-401(3)(a). He does not
challenge this fact in his response brief. He does not challenge that “[t]he
timeliness of the . . . petition . . . is a question of jurisdictional significance.”
Living Rivers v. U.S. Oil Sands, Inc., 2014 UT 25, ¶ 18, 344 P.3d 568.
Instead, Mr. Price claims that his failure to file a timely petition for
judicial review does not matter for two reasons: first, he says he’s only
defending against a civil enforcement proceeding under Utah Code § 63G-4501(3); and second, he says he has the right to seek judicial review without
exhausting all available administrative remedies in limited circumstances
under Utah Code § 63G-4-401(2)(b).
Mr. Price’s first argument fails because this is not a civil enforcement
proceeding. This is a garnishment proceeding. Section 63G-4-501 was not
meant to be a catchall provision applying to all possible administrative and
judicial proceedings. This is shown by section 63G-4-501(1)(a) that explains
that civil enforcement proceedings are in “addition to other remedies
provided by law.” One such other remedy is a Rule 64 garnishment

proceeding. Indeed, section 501(2)(c) states that an civil enforcement action
cannot request, nor can the court grant, “any monetary payment apart from
taxable costs.” Mr. Price could not use this garnishment proceeding to
challenge those prior decisions; he could only challenge the garnishment
itself. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 64D does not authorize a challenge to
the underlying judgment, only to matters related to the garnishment. This
Court has already held that district courts lack “subject matter jurisdiction to
consider a collateral attack on an underlying judgment in the context of the
garnishment proceedings.” Utah State Tax Comm’n v. Echols, 2006 UT App
19, *1 (per curiam).
Even if this was a civil enforcement proceeding, Mr. Price’s argument
was rejected by the Supreme Court. In Career Service Review Board v. Utah
Department of Corrections, 942 P.2d 933, 939-40 (Utah 1997), the Court
applied res judicata and collateral estoppel to prevent the Department of
Corrections from collaterally attacking the Board’s administrative orders in a
civil enforcement action brought by the Board). “Res judicata, which
subsumes the doctrine of collateral estoppel, applies to administrative
adjudications in Utah.” Id. 938 (internal citation and quotation marks
omitted). Indeed, the court explained that “[t]he enforcement action before
us now is not a continuation of the former administrative adjudication, but a
2

separate action to enforce the order in Parker’s grievance proceeding. Id.
939.
The Utah Supreme Court expressly rejected the claim that a civil
enforcement action could be used to collaterally attack the decision
underlying the order at issue in the action. “This section does not create a
loophole in the doctrine of collateral estoppel by permitting defendants to
resurrect issues in an enforcement action that were decided and put to rest in
previous administrative proceedings between the parties.” Id. at 940. Res
judicata applies to default judgments just as much as it does to other
judgments. A default judgment is a final judgment for the purposes of res
judicata. “The Judgment by Default was a final judgment, i.e., one which
puts an end to a lawsuit by declaring that the plaintiff is or is not entitled to
recover the remedy sought.” Schoney v. Memorial Estates, Inc., 863 P.2d 59,
61 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). Mr. Price’s claims are barred by res judicata.
Second, section 63G-4-401(2)(b) does not apply to this matter. This
section permits a party to an administrative proceeding, in limited
circumstances, to seek immediate judicial review rather than exhaust all
administrative remedies and wait for the entry of a final agency action.
Nothing in this statute allows a party to seek untimely judicial review
through subsequent garnishment proceedings. Indeed, subsection 3 of the
3

statute requires that a petition for review be filed within 30 days of the entry
of the final agency action. Utah Code § 63G-4-401(3)(a). This Mr. Price
failed to do.
II.

Utah law does not require the service of notice be sent by
certified mail in wage claim proceedings.
The applicable Utah statute requires that notices to parties be mailed.

Utah Code § 63G-4-201(2)(b)(i) (“mail the notice of agency action to each
party”). Nothing in the statute requires that any particular type of mail be
used, such as certified mail. Contrary to the district courts’ decision, this
Court has not required that service be made by certified mail when the rule
in question required that the service be by “mailing a copy to the last known
address.” Davis v. Goldsworthy, 2008 UT App 145, ¶ 13, 184 P.3d 626. In
Davis, the district court held that personal service was required to serve the
defendant a notice to appear personally or appoint new counsel and set aside
a prior default judgment. Id. ¶ 8. In reversing, this Court held that serving
notice by first class mail was sufficient where the rule simply required the
service be mailed. Id. ¶ 13. The district court erred when it held that a
statute requiring notice to be mailed meant certified mail.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Anderson v. Public Service
Commission, 839 P.2d 822 (Utah 1992) is not to the contrary. In that case,
4

the statute required that notice be sent by certified mail. Id. 825. The PSC
had complied with the certified mail requirement, but Anderson still argued
that he should have been served by personal service. The Court disagreed
and held that certified mail was adequate and personal service, or proof of
actual notice was not required: “The most burdensome form of service
articulated [in the statute] is certified mail. Thus, we can infer that, at
most, the legislature intended that the Commission be obligated to serve its
orders by certified mail, not by personal service.” Id.
Likewise, this Court recently held that a statute mandating that notice
be sent by “certified mail” required notice by U.S. Postal Service certified
mail, not some other method of sending notice. John Kuhni & Sons Inc. v.
Labor Commission, 2018 UT App 6, ¶¶ 20-21. This Court only required the
use of the statutory method for providing notice. It did not require, as did
the district court, the use of a more burdensome method of service.
Despite Mr. Price’s implications to the contrary, “actual notice” in an
administrative proceeding is not the standard for determining whether a
party was afforded due process. The Utah Supreme Court rejected that
standard in Anderson, 839 P.2d at 825 (“We do not believe that the
Constitution requires actual notice under these circumstances”).

5

The standard for due process, or service of notice, for an administrative
proceeding is not the same as that for a civil action commenced under the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. “[N]otice must be ‘reasonably calculated
under all the circumstances’ to give interested parties an opportunity to
protect their interests. Under this standard, the proper inquiry focuses on
whether the agency ‘acted reasonably in selecting means likely to inform
persons affected, not whether each [affected person] actually received notice.’”
Id. (citing Mullane v Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313314 (1950)).
When adjudicative proceedings are commenced by a State agency, Utah
law requires that the agency mail the notice of agency action to each party,
publish the notice of agency action if required by statute, and mail the notice
of agency action to any other person who has a right to notice under statute
or rule. Utah Code § 63G-4-201(2)(b).
In this case, the Commission’s actions satisfied the requirements of due
process because the Commission’s mailings to Mr. Price were reasonably
calculated to give him an opportunity to protect his interests. Mailing the
original notices of the wage claim, as well as the Preliminary Findings and
the final Order, to the addresses for Mr. Price found in the Articles of
Organization for Mad Cow and Level 11 was reasonably calculated to give
6

Mr. Price an opportunity to protect his interests. The Commission acted
reasonably in selecting these addresses as being the means most likely to
inform Mr. Price of the matter. While stating, that the Department of
Commerce’s business directory was open to fraud, the district court admitted
that “[n]either party has presented evidence of whether this sort of situation
has occurred in the past and how often.” R. 301.
III.

Heaps applies retroactively to those actions that are ongoing.
Mr. Price’s argument that Heaps v. Nuriche, LLC, 2015 UT 26, 345

P.3d 655, should be applied in this appeal fails to address this Court’s prior
holding that new precedents are applied retroactively only to ongoing actions.
Home Health & Hospices LLC v. Rita Huber, 2016 UT App 183, ¶¶ 5, 10-12,
382 P.3d 1074.
The default order at issue was entered in 2011. R. 203-206. The
Abstract of Judgment was filed in the district court on June 6, 2012. R. 1-2.
The underlying administrative action had been completed well before Heaps
was decided. Mr. Price’s argument would require a new decision to be
applied to unappealed final orders. New decisions should only be applied in
ongoing actions, including those timely appealed from a lower court’s decision
or an administrative decision.

7

LABOR COMMISSION’S RESPONSE BRIEF
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL
The district court denied attorney fees “at this point” based on a
question of fact. R. 305. Has Mr. Price properly briefed his attorney fees
issue when he fails to address the actual decision made by the district court?
Preservation and Standard of Review
This issue was ruled on by the district court. R. 305. “A district
court’s factual findings are reviewed deferentially under the clearly erroneous
standard, and its conclusions of law are reviewed for correctness with some
discretion given to the application of the legal standards to the underlying
factual findings.” Ericksen v Ericksen, 2018 UT App 184, ¶ 12 (internal
quotation omitted).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The district court denied Mr. Price’s motion for attorney fees, holding
that there were insufficient facts in the record to make the necessary finding
of bad faith. “At this point, it is insufficient to demonstrate that the
Commission acted in bad faith.” R. 305. The court explained that if the
Commission proceeded in this matter “based on a prior interpretation of the
law and believed in good faith that its counsel told them it would not be
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retroactive, it would not be bad faith. However, the facts are insufficient to
determine that bad faith has occurred at this juncture.” Id.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Mr. Price appeals the denial of his attorney fees that he sought
pursuant to Utah Code § 78B-5-825. But he has failed to address the actual
holding of the district court. It only denied his motion “at this point”
because there were inadequate facts in the record to determine whether the
Commission’s conduct was in bad faith. Specifically, the court was
concerned that there was insufficient evidence as to whether the Commission
was acting in good faith by relying on the advice of its counsel. R. 305. The
current action deals with an abstract of judgment and efforts to collect on the
Commission’s decision. Mr. Price has not addressed the district court’s
actual decision. Whether or not the facts before the district court were
adequate has not been briefed.
ARGUMENT
Mr. Price has failed to address the district court’s actual factual
findings regarding his claim for attorney fees.
Mr. Price sought attorney fees based on his claim that the Commission
had acted in bad faith in trying to collect on the default judgment against
him. His claim is based on the Heaps decision that was decided after the
9

default judgment was issued and the garnishment proceeding commenced.
The district court declined “at this point” to grant his motion because of
factual questions that remained unresolved. To award bad faith attorney
fees, the statute requires both that the case was without merit and that it
was brought in bad faith. Still Standing Stable, LLC v. Allen, 2005 UT 46, ¶
9, 122 P.3d 556. Finding that a party acted in bad faith “turns on a factual
determination of a party's subjective intent.” Id. (internal quotation
omitted). The court must find that one or more of the following factors is
lacking. “(1) [a]n honest belief in the propriety of the activities in question;
(2) no intent to take unconscionable advantage of others; and (3) no intent to,
or knowledge of the fact that the activities in question will hinder, delay, or
defraud others.” Id. at 12 (internal quotations omitted).
The district court declined to grant Mr. Price’s request for attorney fees
because it found there were inadequate facts to make its decision on whether
this test was met. The court noted that, by statute, the Commission was to
rely on the legal opinion of its counsel or the attorney general that its order
“is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law.” Utah Code §
34A-5-108(1)(b). The court added that “[i]f it did proceed in this action based
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on a prior interpretation of the law and believed in good faith that its counsel
told them it would not be retroactive, it would not be bad faith.” R. 305.
Mr. Price claims that the Commission’s failure to return the amount it
has garnished from him is proof of its bad faith. Price’s Brief at 44. And
yet the district court noted that the Commission does not have that money, it
had already sent the money to the wage claimant. R. 304-05.
It is also significant that the Commission’s challenged decisions and
the abstract of judgment that it filed with the district court have not been
overturned. The district court’s order quashed one particular writ of
garnishment and ordered Mr. Price to “pursue a motion to set aside in the
administrative proceeding with notice to all interested parties.” R. 306.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the district court’s decision should be
reversed.
Respectfully submitted this

9th

day of Occtober, 2018.

/s/ Brent A. Burnett
BRENT A. BURNETT
Assistant Solicitor General
Attorney for the Office of Recovery
Services
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